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The economic impact of the Troubled Assets 
Relief Programme (TARP) in the USA: an 
assessment of the level to which an optimal 
allocation of funds occurred
C.J. van Aardt & G.P. Naidoo
3 6A B S T R A C T
The 2009 international fi nancial crisis has led to many countries, 
including the USA, bailing out their fi nancial institutions. This 
article provides a unique perspective of the bailout issue by looking 
at the impact of the quantitative easing in monetary policy on 
competitiveness as well as providing multiplier impacts through the 
use of the US 2002 I-O table. Specifi cally, three areas are considered 
within this model: whether the Troubled Assets Relief Programme 
(TARP)1 bailout will give rise to greater economic effi  ciencies and 
productivity, which would include determining whether the TARP 
bailouts give rise to the survival of fi nancial institutions and the 
stabilisation of the fi nancial sector; determining the direct, indirect 
and induced impacts of the TARP bailout on the economy (short-
term); and determining the long-term benefi ts of the TARP 1 bailout 
on the economy (by focusing on long-term capital realisation). The 
fi ndings of this econometric analysis raise questions of the validity 
of government intervention in the form of bailouts.
Key words:  bailout, competitiveness, input-output analysis, economic impact 
assessment, Troubled Assets Relief Programme (TARP)
Introduction
The recent financial turmoil in the world’s economies can be traced to the collapse of 
some financial institutions in the USA since September/October 2008 (although there 
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is evidence that the initial slowdown can be traced as far back as 1999). The World 
Bank chief economist Justin Yifu Lin (2009) aptly described what happened when he 
wrote that the credit crisis was preceded by six years of global economic boom, which 
encouraged the US Federal Reserve Board to opt for expansionary monetary policies 
leading to large increases in the value of real estate and equity investment in the USA. 
This led to a boom in the housing market, which turned sour and resulted in an equity 
bubble due to rapidly increasing sub-prime risks. The reason for the economic boom 
giving rise to the equity bubble can be explained in the words of the great economist 
Walter Bagehot (1873), who wrote: “… we need not be alarmed at the magnitude of 
our credit system and its refinement, for that we have learned by experience the way of 
controlling it, and always manage it with discretion. But we do not always manage it 
with discretion.” In September 2008 the equity bubble gave rise to a liquidity crisis in 
the global credit market, which was further exacerbated by the threats of insolvencies 
to numerous financial institutions in the USA, including Lehman Brothers and 
other institutions such as the US government-sponsored housing enterprises, Fannie 
May (Federal National Mortgage Association) and Freddie Mac (Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation). Given the turmoil resulting from banks refusing to 
lend (both to other banks and to businesses), this article assesses the effectiveness of 
the allocation of bailout funds by the US government with the intention of stabilising 
the financial sector, resuscitating (slowing) economic activity and encouraging banks 
to get into the business of lending. A number of reasons have been put forward for 
the current situation (see Liebowitz 2008), while blame has been attached to various 
institutions ranging from the rating agencies to deregulation by government. This 
article does not go into detail regarding what caused the calamity, but rather focuses 
on the economic impact of the bailout packages employed, especially with regard to 
whether bailout funds were optimally allocated to address the financial crisis. 
Research problem
The role of government in a country’s economy can vary from complete control 
(interventionist) to absolute absence (free marketism). The extent of government’s 
involvement can also vary, depending on circumstances. It has been normal practice 
for governments to regulate the financial systems in their countries, and governments 
have on occasion intervened directly in financial markets. According to Hanohan and 
Klingebiel (2003), the following two broad approaches are followed by governments 
when faced with banking crises:
• An accommodating approach involving measures such as liquidity support for 
banks experiencing cash-flow problems, depositor guarantees, tolerance of banks 
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violating bank solvency and minimum capitalisation rules and debtor support 
schemes
• A non-accommodating approach involving abiding by the rules and requiring 
banks either to meet requirements or face official intervention.
In the United States, the government decided to take the accommodating approach 
to banks experiencing crises. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 
was enacted as a financial sector bailout package authorising the Secretary of the 
Treasury to spend $700 billion to buy distressed assets, especially mortgage-backed 
securities, and to effect capital injections into banks with the aim of ‘stabilising’ 
such institutions. This Act was adopted on 3 October 2008, creating the Troubled 
Assets Relief Programme (TARP) to purchase failing bank assets (Wikipedia 2009). 
Through TARP funds, the US government buys illiquid mortgage-backed securities 
with the aim of increasing the liquidity of secondary mortgage markets, thereby 
reducing the losses suffered by financial institutions owning such securities in order 
to ‘bail out’ such institutions. Although there are many TARP supporters in favour 
of ensuring financial stability in the United States, there are also groups that are 
sceptical of TARP’s ability to stabilise the US financial sector as well as its ability to 
boost the economy.
Many analysts view the possible squandering of TARP funds (which were used 
to pay bonuses as well as chase losses) as a reason to question the efficacy of TARP 
in bailing out affected financial institutions. Their point of view is that should 
financially unsound institutions be bought out by other institutions, it would be less 
of a burden on taxpayers. Government, however, regards certain institutions as being 
‘too big to fail’, and will put in place whatever measures are deemed appropriate to 
ensure the survival of such companies. Critics of this practice question the basis of 
such decisions, particularly in the light of the perception that governments tend to 
assist their friends. For example, why was Lehman Brothers allowed to fail, while 
similarly large institutions such as Goldman Sachs were bailed out? It should be 
noted that government effectively buys the shares of distressed companies and then 
sells these shares at some point in the future (in most cases at a higher price than was 
paid), thus ensuring that the taxpayer benefits over the medium to long term. 
However, it must be noted that it is not unusual for governments to provide some 
funding to institutions requiring assistance. For example, governments provide 
subsidies for institutions offering unique or rare services, such as to offset capital 
expenditure, for research and development, and possibly to implement policies of a 
political nature. It is not uncommon for governments to provide some basis on which 
economic activity takes place, such as expropriations of land for certain projects.
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Government’s role in the handling of the USA’s financial crisis may have been 
regarded as having been more effective if it had guided financial control rather than 
trying to solve the problem. In this regard, government should be more vigilant of the 
ways in which financial practices and procedures are accounted for. The recent Madoff 
case (for more details on this, see, for example, Wikipedia 2010) indicates that the 
relevant authorities (including the US Securities and Exchange Commission) were 
not fully acquainted with the ways in which financial transactions were handled. 
The burden on the fiscus thus increases, and the resulting pressures are then passed 
on to the rest of the economy (including government borrowing and reprioritisation 
of government goals).
The current financial crisis has spread to all areas of the economy, with varying 
effects. These include a drop in economic activity (encompassing, among other 
things, the associated increased unemployment, decrease in new ventures, and stricter 
control measures by most institutions), as well as general uncertainty regarding the 
extent of the slowdown. Many governments have tried to address the situation by 
making funds available to banks and other institutions (see Table 1).
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, this article will focus on the question 
of whether TARP represented an optimal allocation of bailout funds by the US 
government to stabilise the US financial sector and to safeguard the US economy. 
With that in mind, the following three objectives for this study were formulated: 
• To determine whether the TARP bailout will give rise to greater economic 
efficiencies and productivity. This would include indicating whether the TARP 
bailouts give rise to the survival of financial institutions and the stabilisation of 
the financial sector.
• To determine the short-term direct, indirect and induced impacts of the TARP 
bailout on the economy.
• To reflect on the medium- and longer-term implications and/or benefits of the 
TARP bailout on the economy (by focusing on long-term capital realisation).
This paper addresses these three stated objectives by means of the following four 
methodologies: (1) a financial stability assessment to determine whether the TARP 
bailout package did give rise to higher efficiencies; (2) an economic competitiveness/
efficiency analysis to determine whether the TARP bailout did give rise to increased 
levels of competitiveness of the US economy on international markets; (3) input-
output modelling using a US social accounting matrix (SAM) to determine the direct, 
indirect and induced impact of the bailout package; and (4) a long-term economic 
assessment to assess the long-term benefits of the bailout package. 
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For the purposes of this article, an optimal allocation of bailout funds would have 
been effective if the bailout package had given rise to: (1) higher efficiencies, (2) 
increased levels of competitiveness, (3) strong positive direct, indirect and induced 
impacts with strong economic multipliers and (4) long-term benefits to the economy. 
This approach is in line with that of Kriebel and Raviv (1980) in terms of which 
input-output analyses using a social accounting matrix (SAM) could be used to 
determine the performance of an economic input (TARP funds in the case of this 
article) in order to determine whether such funds were optimally allocated.
Theoretical and empirical background
The estimated value of bailouts globally (at the end of January 2009) was about 
$2 145 886 745 000 (or just over $2.1 trillion). In addition, the total value of all country 
or regional guarantees was $6 235 262 500 000 (or just over $6.2 trillion). While these 
figures are impressive, it is when they are considered as percentages of GDP that the 
full impact of such injections is realised. Global bailout amounts as well as bailouts 
as a percentage of GDP are shown in Table 1.
It appears from Table 1 that bailout amounts differ from as little as $518 million in 
Serbia (constituting 1.2% of Serbia’s GDP) to $725 trillion in the USA (constituting 
5.2% of the USA’s GDP). Furthermore, bailouts as a percentage of GDP differ from 
as low as 0.1% in India to 39.9% in Latvia. Although governments have poured huge 
sums of money directly into the financial sector, as is evident from Table 1, various 
other options have been considered (and are continually being reviewed), such as:
• The way in which companies mark up their assets in their balance sheet. The 
common practice has been to reflect assets at what were perceived to be market 
values. However, it became evident that these valuations differed from the actual 
value of the relevant asset. Therefore banks and other institutions reflected inflated 
values on their balance sheet. It was also evident that the various accounting 
practices (for example, the International Financial Reporting Standards) were 
fairly flexible in the way asset values were recorded.
• The United States government also reduced its key lending rates from over 5% 
to almost 0% (the official rate is: 0–0.25%). This resulted in homeowners paying 
lower bond repayments, but ensured that banks were receiving slightly more 
income from bonds. However, many sub-prime bondholders were unable to meet 
this reduced payment.
• Governments also tried to encourage inter-bank lending. Due to the worsening 
crisis, banks almost stopped lending to each other as they had no confidence that 
their money would be recovered. In this regard, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
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Corporation (FDIC) ensured that financial institutions spent $12.5 billion to 
cover the deposits of 64 banks that had become bankrupt during the first seven 
months of 2009 (Goldseek 2009).
Table 1:  Comparative analysis of bailout amounts paid in selected countries and their 
associated bailout to GDP ratios
Country Bailout amount ($) (’000) GDP (2007) ($) (’000) Bailout as % of GDP
Latvia 10 830 000 27 154 000 39.9
Iceland 5 100 000 19 510 000 26.1
United Arab Emirates 32 600 000 129 702 000 25.1
Hungary 31 930 000 138 182 000 23.1
United Kingdom 511 237 000 2 727 806 000 18.7
Russia 229 472 400 1 291 011 000 17.8
Norway 56 320 770 381 951 000 14.7
Switzerland 59 300 000 415 516 000 14.3
Netherlands 94 240 800 754 203 000 12.5
Qatar 5 300 000 42 463 000 12.5
Ukraine 16 500 000 140 484 000 11.7
Belarus 4 500 000 44 771 000 10.1
Luxembourg 4 197 470 47 942 000 8.8
Belgium 26 606 570 448 560 000 5.9
Denmark 17 885 000 308 093 000 5.8
Oman 2 000 000 35 729 000 5.6
Austria 20 300 000 377 028 000 5.4
Pakistan 7 600 000 143 597 000 5.3
USA 725 000 000 13 811 200 000 5.2
Greece 17 663 100 360 031 000 4.9
Spain 69 157 243 1 429 226 000 4.8
Kazakhstan 5 000 000 103 840 000 4.8
South Korea 42 180 000 969 795 000 4.3
Germany 136 650 000 3 297 233 000 4.1
El Salvador  800 000 20 215 000 4.0
Ireland 7 690 000 254 970 000 3.0
France 65 900 680 2 565 288 000 2.6
Sweden 8 739 552 444 443 000 2.0
Canada 21 570 000 1 326 376 000 1.6
Serbia  518 000 41 581 000 1.2
Chile  850 000 163 915 000 0.5
China 8 000 000 3 280 053 000 0.2
Australia 1 283 000 821 716 000 0.2
India 719 000 1 170 968 000 0.1
Source: Grail Research (2009)
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•  Quantitative monetary easing, or printing of money, makes it easier for government 
to provide funds to the various institutions. The obvious risk is that the increase in 
liquidity will lead to inflation, but the recent decrease in commodity prices seems 
to indicate that the near-term deflation effects are more serious than the medium-
term inflation.
• Governments may nationalise banks and other institutions. In many cases, 
governments now own a majority share of various institutions. For example, 
the United States government is already a majority shareholder in the American 
Insurance Group (AIG), while they also have significant interests in other industries 
such as the automotive sector (in the United States, Ford), aviation (in India, Air 
India) and real estate (in Germany, Hypo). Funding in this regard has taken place 
through soft loans, bank guarantee schemes, the creation of stabilisation funds for 
banks, guaranteed inter-bank loans and provision of emergency loans.
• There has been talk of creating institutions that would absorb all bad debts. 
These so-called ‘bad banks’ remove troubled assets from financial institutions, 
thereby allowing them to continue with their core business. However, there are a 
number of challenges in this regard. These include who is responsible for the cost 
of removing the inferior assets, the burden on the taxpayer, and the possibility that 
institutions may abuse the facility to dispose of other unwanted toxic assets.
• The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been requested to assist several 
countries experiencing balance of payments problems (including Hungary, 
Serbia, Ukraine and Pakistan).
• Some governments took measures to support currencies. For example, both the 
G7 and the Japanese government considered taking measures to support other 
currencies against the yen.
Economic impact modelling methodology
As indicated in the statement of the research problem, the economic impact 
assessment methodology used in this study encompassed four types of economic 
impact analyses: (1) financial stability assessment, (2) economic competitiveness/
efficiency analysis, (3) input-output modelling to determine the direct, indirect and 
induced impact of the bailout package and (4) long-term economic assessment. The 
methodologies used in conducting such impact analyses will be discussed.
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Financial stability assessment
The IMF (2009) makes use of financial stability maps to assess global financial 
stability. Such maps make use of the following six criteria: 
• Macroeconomic risks
• Emerging market risks
• Credit risks
• Market and liquidity risks
• Risk appetite
• Monetary and financial risk.
In this study, these criteria were applied to the US financial system to determine 
whether the TARP bailout package in fact gave rise to higher levels of financial 
stability. It appears from information provided by the IMF (2009) that the six criteria 
are jointly excellent indicators of the financial stability of a country. Furthermore, the 
2009 international credit crisis has shown that should one of these indicators (namely, 
credit risk) be negatively impacted on by one or more of the other indicators (namely, 
macro-economic, market and liquidity risks), financial instability will increase.
Competitiveness/effi  ciency impact analysis methodology
The Global Competitiveness Index provides an analytical tool for assessing the 
efficacy of bailouts in either strengthening or weakening the competitive advantage 
of a specific country. This is done by determining whether an injection – such as a 
bailout – will strengthen, weaken or have no effect on a specific competitive aspect. 
The Global Competitiveness Index (Porter & Schwab 2008) consists of the following 
12 sub-indices:
• Institutional efficacy
• Quality of infrastructure
• Macroeconomic stability
• Health and primary education
• Higher education and training
• Goods market efficiency
• Labour market efficiency
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For the purposes of this article, the criteria making up each of these sub-indices 
were used to determine whether the United States bailout package had had a positive 
or negative impact, or had had no impact, on each of the competitive aspects reflected 
in the World Competitiveness Index sub-indices.
Input-output analysis methodology
The calculations of the economic impact of a financial bailout package are based 
on the multisectoral input-output model. The benefit of this framework is that the 
impact of a government investment in the economy can be determined.
It suffices to mention that the input-output model comprises mathematical 
equations linking the economic flows between sectors. This model is ideally suited 
to application in the field of economic impact analysis. For impact analysis, the 
following can be measured in terms of both backward and forward linkages:
• Initial impact on sector being bailed out (direct impact)
• Impact of bailouts on value added throughout the total economy, both upstream 
and downstream (indirect impact)
• Impact on compensation and tax (induced impacts).
It should be noted that the impacts are measured as follows:
• Initial impact: The initial impact is the impact of a particular project or activity 
on the economy. The initial impact on gross value added of the bailout package 
is brought about by the ‘financial shock’ introduced into a specific sector. This 
impact is sometimes referred to as a direct impact.
• Indirect impact: Indirect impacts are determined from the activities of suppliers. 
For example, suppliers include those industries that deliver goods and services to 
producers and service providers and include, for example, suppliers of computers 
and paper to sectors being ‘financially shocked’. Activities of these industries are 
expanded as a result of the said shock. Such industries are referred to as first-round 
suppliers that could in turn stimulate further demand in, for example, the mining 
sector supplying additional steel to computer manufacturers for the production 
of computers. All these transactions originate from the initial production of the 
bailout package.
• Induced impact: Induced impacts are the impact/s on the economy due to 
increased aggregate demand by households for goods and services as a result of 
income earned due to the bailout packages provided (in other words, the income 
of employees and shareholders of companies increases because of additional 
income arising through backward linkages of spending in the economy). 
Backward (or upstream) linkages are, for example, the additional employment 
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created by computer manufacturers resulting from the increased demand for their 
products, which in turn stimulates production in the mining industry supplying 
steel for computer casings. Forward (or downstream) linkages are, for example, 
the additional employment created by manufacturers and mining plants due to a 
bigger demand for their products.
In summary, it can be stated that the initial impact of the bailout package may be 
regarded as the actual economic contribution of the government investment, while 
the indirect and induced impacts may be regarded as the spill-over or multiplier 
effects of the government bailout package on the US economy.
It is important to note that there are a variety of input-output (I-O) models ranging 
from the simplest versions such as Supply and Demand Matrices (SDM) to more 
complex tools/models such as such as Social Accounting Matrices (SAM). Whereas 
the SDM models include only a limited number of national accounts modules, the 
typical SAM model includes many national accounts modules such as supply and 
demand matrices, employment and compensation modules, and tax modules. An 
input-output (I-O) model was used in this study to determine the economic impact 
of the TARP bailout package on the American economy. This model is based on a 
2002 input-output model constructed by the US Bureau of the Census. The structure 
of the I-O model used is shown in Table 2.













Source: Miller & Blair (2009); Leontief (1986)
In the study under discussion, the economic shocks injections of $700 billion 
dollars were effected, and the impact of such injections were assessed in terms of 
direct, indirect and induced impacts on the US economy. Different types of $700 
billion injections were effected to determine the optimal distribution thereof, namely:
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• Injection 1: Unisectoral financial injections by the US government of $700 billion 
dollars in the various economic sectors to determine inter alia the direct, indirect 
and induced impacts of the TARP injection of $700 billion dollars into the 
financial sector alone.
• Injection 2: A multisectoral injection by the US government of $700 billion, part 
of which goes to the financial sector to stabilise the financial sector and the rest 
to other economic sectors to serve as stimulus package. Various distributions of 
$700 billion across sectors were assessed to obtain an optimal allocation of bailout 
funds. Eventually the optimal sectoral distribution of TARP money across sectors 
could be compared with the unisectoral approach adopted by the US government 
to determine the level to which bailout funds were optimally allocated. 
Long-term economic impact assessment methodology
In an analysis of the fiscal impact of the 9/11 disaster in New York City, Thompson 
(2002) distinguishes between short-term economic impacts that are generally 
measured through input-output analysis as described, as well as long-term economic 
impacts that are made up of long-term wealth, infrastructure, economic contribution, 
long-term output and long-term capital (physical, social and human capital) impacts. 
To determine long-term impacts, the extent to which an economic injection gave 
rise to sustainable higher levels of economic output, employment, compensation, 
domestic investment and fixed capital formation needs to be investigated.
Results and discussion of results
Results of fi nancial stability analysis
When scrutinising TARP transactions data released by the US Treasury Department 
(2009), it is clear that numerous banks have benefited from the TARP bailout 
programme. Such bailouts of financial institutions succeeded in mitigating several 
of the risks to financial stability, as discussed, including:
• Monetary and financial risks by stabilising the financial sector and enhancing 
investor confidence in the US economy
• Macroeconomic risks by preventing a run on US banks and by mitigating against 
many banking clients being hard hit by banks becoming insolvent
• Credit risks by purchasing inferior assets, thereby ‘standing in’ for large amounts 
of bad debt in the United States
• Emerging market risks by mitigating some of the effects of a struggling US 
financial system on emerging economies.
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Although the TARP bailout plan did not fully succeed in restoring risk appetite 
and mitigating against market and liquidity risks, it can be expected that a more 
stable US financial system would over the medium term give rise to a restored 
appetite for risk and market liquidities. The question could, however, be asked 
whether the broad-brush approach in which bailouts were effected would ensure 
financial institution survival over the longer term.
Results of competitiveness/effi  ciency analysis
The current financial crisis indicates that, without government assistance in the 
form of financial injections, many companies become uncompetitive. In normal 
circumstances, governments assist many sectors by providing incentives for their 
initial survival. For example, a company working with new technologies may be 
given additional or substantial tax breaks, special subsidies and other benefits to 
ensure its survival. In many other cases, it is possible that government may subsidise 
the activities of the specific company until it is able to fend for itself. In this article, 
we are not looking at start-up companies but are rather indicating the possible 
consequences of government bailing out existing companies for them to survive. For 
example, funds injected into the AIG ensured that it remained competitive. With 
the realisation that government will make funds available, such companies may be 
less efficient in the way they do business. This study excludes possible international 
ramifications due to currency depreciation and other export/import incentives. 
Most of the capital injection in the US took place in the last three quarters of 2009. 
It is therefore unrealistic to determine at this stage whether the assisted companies 
have become as competitive as they should have been had government not intervened, 
or whether it would have been better to allow them to fail in the first place. However, 
it is well known that some sectors in the US, such as the medical sector, are in any 
event uncompetitive. If it were not for the US government continuing to support this 
sector, even before the financial crisis, it would not be able to compete with other 
sectors. 
The results of the analysis regarding the competitiveness impacts of the United 
States bailout package are shown in Table 3.
Table 3 shows six neutral impacts, five negative impacts, and one with both positive 
and negative impacts (namely, macroeconomic stability). This is due to the bailout 
package, which to a certain extent will give rise to short-term financial stability while 
negatively impacting on an already large fiscal deficit, inflation as well as high levels 
of government debt. Further concerns have to be noted with respect to the current 
practice of quantitative easing of monetary policy, which could lead to various possible
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Institutional effi  cacy
29 -
Negative impact on the favouritism in 
decisions of government offi  cials; on 
wastefulness of government spending; 
on the burden of government regulation; 
on the ethical behaviour of fi rms; on 
the strength of auditing and reporting 




Bailout package is silent on 
infrastructural development
Macroeconomic stability
66 + & -
Positive impact on the stability of the 
fi nancial sector
Negative impact on the government 
defi cit; infl ation; interest rate spread and 
government debt
Health and primary 
education 34 0
Bailout package is silent on health and 
primary education
Higher education and 
training 5 0
Bailout package is silent on higher 
education and training
Goods market effi  ciency
8 -
Negative impact on local competition; 
market dominance by large institutions; 
anti-monopoly policies; foreign 
portfolio and direct investments
Labour market effi  ciency
1 0
Bailout package is silent on labour 
market effi  ciency
Financial market 
sophistication 9 -
Negative impact on the level of 
sophistication; soundness of banks, and 
restriction on capital fl ows
Technological readiness
11 0
Bailout package is silent on 
technological readiness
Market size 1 0 Bailout package is silent on market size
Business sophistication
4 -
Negative impact on cluster development; 
competitive advantage and value chain 
breadth (not being extended)
Innovation
1 -
Negative impact on capacity for 
innovation; research and development
+: positive; -: negative; 0: neutral
negative consequences, varying from severe deflation (given the large loss of jobs), 
decreased real values of property, depressed equity values and/or inflation resulting 
from flooding of the monetary system. 
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Results of input-output analyses
Having completed an analysis of the impact of the Unites States bailout package on 
various aspects pertaining to the competitiveness of the US economy, an analysis was 
conducted of the direct, indirect and induced impacts of the bailout package using 
input-output analysis methodology.
Tables 4 and 5 show the direct, indirect and induced impacts of the government 
injection over the short term. For these tables, each of the different sectors was ‘shocked’ 
with a government capital injection equivalent to $700 billion. The resulting impact 
(quadrant description) in dollar terms (billions of dollars) can be seen in Table 4, 
while the associated economic multipliers derived from Table 4 are shown in Table 5.
Table 4:  Direct, indirect and induced impacts resulting from a $700 billion injection 






















Agriculture 8 606 1 175 41 1 035 2 250 10 856
Utilities 2 472 659 73 348 1 080 3 552
Construction 944 96 13 88 197 1 141
Manufacturing 3 123 711 52 329 1 092 4 215
Wholesale 1 788 339 42 164 544 2 333
Retail 838 49 4 26 79 917
Transport and 
warehousing 2 998 864 128 418 1 409 4 408
Information 2 027 573 55 329 956 2 983
Finance 1 822 419 79 446 944 2 767
Professional 
and business 
services 7 436 2 908 320 1 526 4 754 12 190
Education 745 29 1 6 36 781




(NGOs) 1 289 263 27 147 437 1 727
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Agriculture 12.295 1.678 0.058 1.478 3.214 15.509
Utilities 3.531 0.942 0.104 0.497 1.543 5.075
Construction 1.348 0.137 0.019 0.126 0.281 1.630
Manufacturing 4.461 1.016 0.074 0.470 1.560 6.022
Wholesale 2.555 0.484 0.060 0.234 0.778 3.333
Retail 1.198 0.070 0.006 0.037 0.113 1.310
Transport and 
warehousing 4.283 1.234 0.182 0.597 2.013 6.296
Information 2.895 0.818 0.078 0.470 1.366 4.262
Finance 2.603 0.598 0.113 0.637 1.349 3.952
Professional and 
business services 10.623 4.154 0.457 2.180 6.791 17.414
Education 1.065 0.041 0.001 0.009 0.051 1.116
Arts and culture 1.660 0.307 0.031 0.168 0.506 2.166
Non-governmental 
organisations 
(NGOs) 1.842 0.375 0.039 0.211 0.625 2.467
For example, if the agricultural sector had an injection of $700 billion, based on 
the US I-O table for 2002 (basic values, imports shown separately), the resulting total 
intermediate inputs would increase by about $8 606 billion, while the compensation 
of employees would increase by about $1 175 billion; net taxes on production and 
imports by $41 billion; gross operating surplus by $1 035 billion; total value added to 
the economy by $2 250 billion, resulting in the total industry output being boosted by 
$10 856 billion. This could, for example, be compared to the financial sector, which 
showed total intermediate input increasing by $1 822 billion, and total industry 
output by $2 767 billion. It is evident from this example that the $700 billion injection 
into the agricultural sector gave rise to almost four times higher total industry output 
growth than was the case when the financial sector was subjected to a $700 billion 
injection. Table 5 shows the multiplier effects of the injection on the different sectors. 
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For example, by government injecting $700 billion into the financial sector, the 
multiplier effect of such an injection would be 2.6 with respect to total intermediate 
inputs, 0.6 to compensation of employees and 3.9 to total industry output. This is 
far lower when compared to the professional and business services sector, where a 
similar injection resulted in a total intermediate input multiplier of 10.6, an employee 
compensation multiplier of 4.1, and a total industry output multiplier of 17.4.
It should be noted that Tables 4 and 5 refer to direct injections of $700 billion 
per sector in individual economic/I-O analyses. However, government may wish to 
spread the injection across the economy. Table 6 shows the economic impact brought 
about by an optimal injection mix obtained by conducting a variety of input-output 
simulations using different injection mixes. 
Table 6: Optimal injection mix determined by means of input-output modelling
Economic impact variable $ billion Multiplier
Total intermediate inputs 4 581 6.54
Compensation of employees 1 280 1.83
Taxes on production and imports, less subsidies 139 0.20
Gross operating surplus 822 1.17
Total value added 2 240 3.20
Total industry output 6 822 9.75
It appears from Table 5 that by injecting the $700 billion into the financial sector, 
a relatively low multiplier pay-off is realised, compared to other sectors. The said 
multiplier for the financial sector was the seventh highest (of 13 sectors). Also, with 
respect to employee compensation, the financial sector multiplier was 0.6 (it also was 
the seventh highest of 13 sectors). Similarly, the total industry output multiplier for 
the financial sector was the seventh highest. It should be noted from Table 5 that the 
professional and business sector realised the highest multipliers for all the economic 
variables used as outcome variables. Although at first glance it would appear to be the 
optimal solution to spend the full $700 billion to boost the professional and business 
sector from a purely economic perspective, this may not necessarily address other 
sectoral challenges, particularly in the light of the financial and manufacturing 
sectors playing a crucial role as transmission mechanisms in the economy. This leads 
us to the logical conclusion that, firstly, while injecting the full $700 billion into the 
financial sector could possibly save some inefficient institutions, it would result in 
comparatively low economic pay-offs. Secondly, the optimal solution would be to 
distribute the $700 billion injection in such a way that the more vital and efficient 
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institutions in the financial and manufacturing sectors are saved, while having 
optimal economic pay-offs. The ultimate solution would be to ensure the survival of 
such institutions while enhancing economic efficiencies and productivity, ensuring 
optimal economic pay-offs in terms of economic and compensation growth together 
with the realisation of economic benefits over the long-term.
If the economy had only two sectors, the production possibility curve could be 
used to ensure maximum gains. Therefore, if only the two highest (multiplier) 
sectors (namely, agriculture and professional services) were taken into account, both 
could be maximised, or all energies could be concentrated on either one. However, 
the production possibility approach is limited to two sectors. It therefore becomes 
necessary to consider alternatives to a multisectoral approach, with the idea of ensuring 
a distribution that assists all sectors (or as many as possible). When contemplating the 
number of sectors to include in a multisectoral solution, cognisance must be taken of 
optimal multiplier effects as well as the need to save struggling sectors. Fortunately 
(or unfortunately), the sectors that need to be supported in the current US I-O are not 
those directly affected by the financial crisis. In relation to this study, it is clear which 
sectors produce the highest multipliers (agricultural, and professional and business 
services sectors) and which sectors need to be secured (financial and manufacturing 
sectors). 
Therefore an analysis was done regarding the economic impact/s of spreading the 
$700 billion injection across these four sectors, specifically by injecting $100 billion 
into the agricultural sector, $100 billion into the manufacturing sector, $300 billion 
into the financial sector and $200 billion into the professional and business services 
sector. The results obtained from such analyses are reflected in Table 6.
Long-term economic impact of bailout package
When focusing on the long-term impact of the bailout package, the big question 
is whether the bailout package over the long-term will be positive or negative for 
the financial sector (being ‘bailed-out’) and the United States economy as a whole. 
To determine this, a comparative analysis was conducted regarding the long-term 
positive and negative impacts resulting from such a bailout package. The results are 
shown in Table 7.
Overview and concluding remarks
First impressions of the bailout package are misleading. When looking at the package 
from a political and politico-economic perspective, it appears to be an absolute 
necessity as a mechanism to ‘save the financial sector’ and to ‘save the economy’.  
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Table 7: Long-term positive and negative impacts resulting from the bailout package
Aspect Positive impact Negative impact
$700 billion injection
Stabilising the fi nancial 
sector
Increasing fi scal defi cit and 
government debt
Focusing total bailout 
package on fi nancial 
sector
Focused approach to dealing 
with toxic assets and 
ensuring fi nancial institution 
survival
Low general economic stimulus 
value
Bailing out struggling 
fi nancial institutions
Ensuring continuity in the 
fi nancial sector
Skewing competitiveness in the 
fi nancial sector
Buying up toxic assets
Taking over assets impacting 
negatively on fi nancial 
stability that could be sold 
later when the crisis is over
Good money being used to buy 
out toxic assets, the value of 
which will probably only increase 
marginally
Using taxpayer money to 
eff ect the bailout
Government as custodian 
of the fi scus demonstrating 
its commitment to fi nancial 
sector stability
Such money could have been 
spent more optimally to the 
benefi t of taxpayers as shown in 




Government acting as a 
stabilising agent in the 
economy
Government actions distorting 
market dynamics, which over 
the long term gives rise to lower 
levels of economic growth and 
development
However, when analysing this package from an econometric perspective, as was 
done in this article, it appears that the package generally is not facilitative towards 
higher levels of competitiveness, increasing output, employment and incomes nor 
to ensuring long-term financial stability, economic growth and development. It can 
further be concluded from the three sets of results presented in this article that TARP 
did not represent an optimal allocation of bailout funds to ensure the stabilisation of 
the financial sector specifically and the broader US economy in general.
Endnotes
1  The TARP was implemented to mitigate the economic impact of the credit 
crisis.  The US government introduced two TARP programmes. The aim of 
TARP1 was to bail out affected financial institutions by ‘buying out’ their ‘toxic’ 
mortgaged assets with the aim of preventing such institutions from failing. 
TARP2 was introduced as a financial stimulus package to ‘kick start’ growth 
in various sectors of the US economy.
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